Institutional and legal differences between countries increase entry costs and reduce the ability of banks to expand abroad. We use bilateral foreign banking data for 176 countries to estimate a gravity model in which bilateral cross border banking activity is explained, in addition to standard variables, by legal and institutional differences. We find that foreign banking is negatively affected by absolute differences in the legal setup and in basic institutions between source and host countries. Differences in the legal origin, for example, reduce bilateral participation in the banking system in nearly 13%.
Introduction
Banks face multiple costs when expanding abroad. On the one hand there are learning and research costs associated with finding profitable investment opportunities, and on the other there are costs of learning how to deal with a different institutional and legal framework. Despite the fact that foreign banking has grown notoriously since the 1990s, especially in Latin America, this paper shows that legal and institutional differences have limited the expansion of banks' activities across borders.
Several recent research papers have shown that foreign banking can contribute to increase the efficiency of financial markets. Claessens et al (2001) suggests that the effects of internationalizing the banking system are positive since banking systems increase their competition and efficiency, in particular when foreign banks come from more developed countries 1 . However there is some controversy on whether credit volatility is reduced or increased by foreign banks. 2 On the one hand, some authors claim that foreign banks are able to stabilize credit when shocks hit the economy because they have access to external funds that allow them to smooth shocks out. Additionally due to their reputation (franchise name), they can able stabilize local deposits in turbulent times. In addition, foreign bank entry may generate competitive pressure that leads to policies that guarantee future stability such as more aggressive provisioning standards and higher capital ratios 3 . On the other hand, some economists claim that foreign banks are more sensitive to shocks in the host economy because they can substitute local assets with alternative investments abroad that are not easily available for local banks 4 .
The decision of banks to expand their activity across their border has been linked to several forms of economic integration, such as bilateral trade flows and FDI, and to specific host and source country characteristics. In the literature there is clear evidence that foreign direct investment in banking is correlated with the degree of integration between the host and the source country. Grosse and Goldberg (1991) , Brealey and Kaplanis (1996) , Williams (1998) and Yamori (1998) measure this relationship using bilateral trade and FDI, and find a positive and significant correlation between proxies of the flow of foreign direct investment in banking and the level of bilateral economic integration 5 . These authors find no conclusive evidence on the link between regulatory restrictions and local market opportunities and the decision of banks to expand abroad. In a recent study, using bank-level 1 See also Levine (1996) and Martinez Pería and Schmukler (1999) .
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See Goldberg (2001 ), Crystal et. al. (2001 ) and IMF (2000 .
3
See Crystal et al (2001) for a discussion. data, Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) show that banks prefer to have subsidiaries in countries where expected profits are larger, owing to higher expected economic growth and the prospect of reducing local banks' inefficiency.
Literature has not focused though on how the cost of learning how to deal with institutional differences across countries, can become an obstacle to foreign banking.
For example, learning how to work in a corrupt system can be costly for a banker whose lifetime experience has been in Switzerland. The cost to learn the skill required to operate in a corrupt state can be high enough as to discourage banking investment in such a country. The opposite can also be true. A banker that has developed expertise in dealing with corruption can be lagged in the development of other particular skills that can make it costly to expand to a less corrupt environment. The same holds for differences in legal codes, regulations and the rule of law. There is a cost in learning how laws treat specific issues and a greater one, probably, in learning how the judicial systems deals with law enforcement. The literature in industrial organization shows that learning costs are an important entry barrier in many industries. 6 This paper shows that besides economics integration and local financial characteristic (profitability, size, etc.), unifying certain rules and regulations and converging towards international institutional standards can reduce barriers to financial integration and allow countries, especially developing ones, to enjoy the benefits of foreign bank penetration.
countries depends on how much they trade and how much they invest abroad in manufacturing. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some broad evidence of the relationship between cross-border banking activity and differences in legal origin. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical framework used. Section 4 presents our results and section 5 concludes.
Broad Evidence
As discussed in the introduction several institutional features can become an entry cost for financial institutions that decide to expand abroad. The most straightforward is differences in legal origin. Our main hypothesis is that banks are more willing to locate in foreign countries with which they share legal features. As shown by La Porta et. al. (1997 The share of bilateral foreign control of bank's assets is the sum of assets of banks of the host country in which the source country owns 50% or more of their equity, divided by the total amount of banks' assets in the host country.
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A source-developed country has on average 3 percent of the host banks' assets when the host country is developed and shares the same legal origin. This percentage drops to only 0.5 percent when the host has a different legal origin.
When the host is a developing country the difference is similar. The same results hold when the source is a developing country; sharing legal origin increases significantly the foreign bank participation in the host country. These results suggest that sharing a similar legal environment significantly reduces the costs of entering a foreign financial market.
The next section presents the data and the empirical framework that we use to explore, more formally, if differences in the basic legal and institutional framework lead to higher financial integration and, additionally, we explore if differences in bank specific regulations lead to the same result.
Data and Empirical Framework
This paper uses bilateral country data to explore how differences in institutions and regulations affect foreign bank cross-border shareholdings.
Cross-border Shareholding Measure
We measure foreign bank penetration according to the control of the banking sector of a source country in any specific host one. This bank-specific data is taken been the principal receivers of FDI in banking, with foreign control of 47% and 41%, respectively, the majority coming from European owners. Europe has foreign participation of nearly 22%, most of it coming from regional banks. In contrast, USA and Canada together have almost 10% of foreign participation in their banking systems while Asia has only 6%.
Legal and Institutional Differences
We use several variables to analyze the impact of differences in institutions and regulations on cross the border banking activity.
Differences in Legal
Origin: This is a dummy that takes the value of one if host and source countries have different legal origins (British, French, Socialist, German or Scandinavian), and zero otherwise. Sharing legal regimes can minimize learning costs in the investment process, and can also reduce operational costs given that certain economies of scale can be exploited at the international level. Our prior is that banks are more willing to locate in foreign countries with which they share legal features. As shown by La Porta et. al. (1997 , the fact that some basic legal features such as the origin of the legal code, are shared, implies that further regulations that protect creditors and shareholders evolve in similar fashions.
Similarities in these regulations reduce costly adaptation to new environments. Our The appendix describes the elements of the banking regulatory index.
9
See Levine (1996) . differences in the efficiency of the judicial system. Their index ranges from 0 to X where higher values indicate more efficient judicial systems. Differences in the efficiency of judiciary authorities imply additional costs for bankers that have to learn how to deal in a different judicial regime.
Empirical Framework
In order to test if institutional and legal differences constitute an entry cost for foreign banks, we follow recent empirical literature on FDI and trade flows that has addressed, to some extent, similar issues. The empirical strategy of this paper is based on the gravity model. This model has been used previously in the empirical literature on the determinants of bilateral trade and in the analysis of FDI location.
The model states that bilateral trade or investment flows depend positively on the
GDP of both economies and negatively on the distance between them, in analogy to
Newton's gravitational attraction between two bodies.
Most applications of this model usually add variables to the simplest gravity specification in order to capture additional effects that can determine the nature of the analyzed flow. Dummies indicating whether two countries share a common border, a common language, past colonial links, among others are usually included.
We also control for other bilateral variables that have been used to explain foreign banking such as trade flows and foreign direct investment.
To the variables that appear in the standard gravity specification we add the institutional and legal differences discussed above. To control for additional effects that can determine the location of banking activity, we include both host and source country dummies. Intuitively, there are several country specific factors that can determine the location of foreign banking activity. The size of the financial markets, both in source and host countries, the profitability of the banking business, the exposure to certain types of risks (credit, currency, maturity, etc.) , and the quality of regulations and institutions among many other factors can limit the decision of banks to increase their international exposure. Identifying the precise factors and moreover controlling for possible endogeneity issues can be a complex task, and goes beyond the objectives of this paper. Therefore, to control for these and additional issues, we include host and source country fixed effects in our basic specifications. We believe that this is the cleanest possible way of identifying the role of institutional and legal differences in the determination of banking location.
In our benchmark model, we estimate how the size of foreign-controlled assets from source country j in host country i is related to standard gravity model variables.
Namely, we control for common border, common language and distance between countries, the source and host country dummies, and other economic integration variables such as trade and FDI. Our regression is of the form: FC: Is the log of 1 plus the foreign participation of source country j in host county i.
We use the log of 1 plus the variable to deal with the fact that many observations are zero, as is usual in this literature. Given that our data is a cross-section, our proxy of foreign bank penetration does not necessarily reflect current investment decisions, but instead shows a sequence of decisions taken during the past.
Cbord: A dummy variable taking value of 1 if the countries share a common border.
Clang: A dummy variable taking value of 1 if the countries share the same language.
Dist
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: The log of the distance between the two countries.
Trade/FDI
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: The log of 1 plus bilateral trade between countries i and j in 1990. In one specification we include the log of 1 plus FDI, however due to data limitations we do not include it in all our estimations. We use 1990 values to reduce potential endogeneity.
Inst/Leg: Are the set of insitutional and legal differences described above.
Dhost and Dsource:
Host and source dummy variables respectively.
The next section shows our empirical results. Table 3 reports the results of the estimation described in the previous section.
Results
Column 1 reports the benchmark regression that includes the standard gravity model controls, bilateral trade, host and source country fixed effects, and the difference in interesting to note that our results enforce previous findings suggesting that foreign banking tends to follow trade.
Column 2 includes FDI as an additional control. As with trade, investment in banking tends to follow other sources of FDI. Given our limited sample on bilateral FDI the number of observations in our estimation is significantly reduced. As above the impact of having legal differences is significant. Given the limitations it imposes on the data we exclude FDI from the following regressions.
Column 3 analyzes differences in banking specific regulations. The result is significant even when controlling for differences in the legal code, and suggests that differences in banking regulations can account for nearly 25% of banking cross border activity 12 .
Columns 4 -7 report the results of differences in the institutional setup, namely they include measures of differences in corruption, the regulatory burden, the rule of law and the efficiency of the judiciary respectively. As before we control for differences in the legal origin. Results confirm the hypothesis that different institutional environments can constitute an entry cost that defers the entry of foreign banks. Learning how to work in a different institutional setup involves learning costs, which apparently are high enough to defer entry. In average institutional differences imply a nearly 30% reduction in cross the border banking.
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This impact is equal to the estimated coefficient multiplied by the standard deviation of the explanatory variable. b Refers to sum of differences in each of 11 elements of the index. c Refers to the absolute value of the difference between the indexes for countries i and j.
Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Empirical results presented above suggest that the difference in regulations and institutions per se play a significant role in explaining foreign bank penetration.
However they do not explain if rules and regulations also determine the direction of the flow of foreign banking activity. In table 4, we include the difference between the variables described above as a regressor, in addition to the absolute value of the difference. The absolute value of the difference shows that independent of the quality of rules and regulations, adapting to a new environment can be costly. The Results are weaker when analyzing differences in institutions. The significance of the simple difference in institutions varies across measures. What remains significant is the absolute value of the difference, which implies that the entry costs hypothesis remains robust.
Conclusions
Legal and institutional differences across countries increase entry costs and reduce the participation of banks in foreign countries. Controlling for variables usually used in the analysis of determinants of bilateral trade and FDI flows, we find that foreign banking activity is significantly reduced between countries that have different legal origins, differences in banking regulation, and in general where the institutional setup (corruption, law enforcement, the burden of regulations and the efficiency of the judiciary system) differs. Learning how to deal with these differences is costly and leads to significance reductions in cross the border banking.
Differences in the legal origin for example can explain a 13% reduction of foreign banking compared to countries that share legal traditions.
Additionally we find that foreign banks locate in countries where regulations and institutions are better than their own. However, even when controlling for this, the results suggesting that the absolute difference matters are robust, that is, despite differences in quality, the cost of learning how to adapt diminishes investment in cross the border banking.
